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Abstract 
The concept of emergence has had a significant effect on architectural theory instigating a 
paradigmatic change in design, affecting the way a building is perceived. In practice the 
practicalities of procuring a building that satisfies necessities, renders engagement with the 
concept largely academic. Otherwise, the physical properties of a building tend to limit 
engagement with emergence at the synchronic level. In this paper we consider how we might 
engage with the creative capacity of emergence at the diachronic level. As an artificial system a 
building may be perceived at different scales. Through computation we can conceive a systemic 
whole, which we may hack to explore the spatio-temporal capacities of the system, bending and 
leveraging behaviour in order to discover new tendencies of space and form. 
 
The formation and generation of spatial configuration is a complex task, which conventional 
approaches tend to quantify, flattening the matter into something manageable. Emergence is a 
concept to explain the manifestation of something which occurs without external influence 
commanding the manner in which it should be. As an approach to designing something it is 
antithetical to the traditional solipsist Cartesian notion of space and form. The concept of emergence 
is of central interest to architecture and the design of artefacts because it is a way of considering the 
configuration of patterns ontologically. It is a perspective which embeds an artefact in a systemic 
manner, such that the perspective is of the components constituting the system, the manner in which 
they interact and how they are affected by context. In this way we might embrace the complexity of 
spatial problems using the complexity as an engine to drive the generation of spatial formation, an 
approach conceived in architecture by mavericks such as Gordon Pask, Cedric Price and Paul 
Coates.
1
  
The term “pattern” refers to a particular, organised arrangement of components in space and time. 
Components which self-organise thereby define space as an underlying property of natural and 
animate systems,
2
 illustrating the creative capacity of autonomous spatial configuration for 
architecture. Being a consequence of a system these patterns are not only structural, or sculptural (in 
the sense of appearance) — they are also behavioural, because the components constituting the 
system are autonomous. In this way our definition of space is determined by the properties of action 
and being, a perception informed by Jakob von Uexküll’s proto-semiotic Umwelt theory3 and the 
bio-cybernetic view of Gregory Bateson.
4
 In applying this thinking to spatial formation we establish 
the condition of an entity-in-its-environment and how this condition may be conceived at different 
scales: at the local level of components in a system, between systems, and at the global level of 
wholes. The focus of this paper is the way in which complex dynamical systems determine spatial 
formation, and the differentiation between the systemic properties that determine their physical 
being and the design of artificial (or human-made) form. Through the capacity to distinguish a 
difference we consider how patterns of spatial formation may be effected at different scales. Our 
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concern is physical emergence and how the concept (coupled with the capacity to distinguish a 
difference) affects the conception of space and form in architecture. We will start by looking at how 
the concept of difference can determine the manner in which we look at the way an entity engages 
with its context,
5
 and how the distinction of a difference applies to the concept of emergence. The 
distinction of a difference illustrates the significance of boundaries: a condition which determines 
heterogeneity and defines spatial formations. The concept of autopoiesis is a spatial process to 
which the condition of a boundary is significant, but the transfer of autopoiesis to social systems is 
a moot issue, and in the end unnecessary. Thinking in terms of autonomic systems we escape the 
pitfalls and establish a means of thinking about self-organisation in natural and artificial systems 
congruently. 
Balance is the chief activity of natural systems—in the sense that they maintain homoeostasis. By 
operating at the diachronic level we seek to affect the balance to topple the system into new 
domains. The system may cease, or it may fluctuate and bend to a new equilibrium. Through 
computational methods we can tap the potential of (diachronic) emergence to affect the production 
of novel properties and capacities in a system. To do this we introduce the idea of hacking, as a way 
of creating new interactions and associations between otherwise disparate entities of a system: to 
push a system beyond its homoeostatic tendency. As a hacker we engage with complexity, tweaking 
and bending the self-organising configuration of a system to mash up its tendencies in order to 
affect new spatial formations. The spatial salience of autonomous entities should be engaged with at 
this level in order to explore the capacities and affordances of a system. Once hacking effects an 
actualized configuration, involvement becomes synchronic. One’s engagement with a system turns 
to the exploration of the capacities of spatial formations. The exploitation of these capacities can 
become suggestive for re-describing practical architectural requirements. The paper sets a 
speculative position, which the authors are developing through computational methods, to rethink 
design theory through practice. 
The Notion of a Difference 
Gregory Bateson identified the capacity to determine a difference as the essential feature of 
complex dynamical systems, established through a coupling with the environment. He defined the 
process a matter of trial and error, through which differences occur. Perceived over time, being what 
we call “change”. What is intriguing about Bateson’s concept is how we can apply it to thinking 
about things at different scales, which is pertinent to architecture, and how from a systems point of 
view it enables one to maintain a view on an element at the local scale whilst considering the 
behaviour of a system (or between systems) at another scale. In essence it determines a perception 
as to how any entities, be they cells, organisms or entities in a computer model, engage with their 
world. It places an emphasis on the properties of something, the way in which these properties may 
“effect” and be affected, and thereby the capacities which are afforded. 
In the hard sciences, effects are, in general caused by rather concrete conditions or 
events – impacts, forces and so forth. But when you enter the world of 
communication, organisation, etc., you have to leave behind that whole world in 
which effects are brought about by forces and impacts and energy exchange. You 
enter a world in which “effects” – and I am not sure one should still use the same 
word – are brought about by differences.6 
Figure 1 shows a rectangle with a line separating two disparate conditions: i.e., a blue and a yellow 
square. The boundary is implicit, so the line simply exaggerates its presence. The boundary declares 
a contrast between disparate conditions: two states which are variants to one another, which the 
border between distinguishes. The boundary defines order and creates structure, which may be 
perceived to facilitate and maintain the variance between one condition and another. In a static 
example like this the idea of the boundary being an active component may seem excessive, but if 
the boundary is perceived to be between a system (say a cell) and its environment then the boundary 
becomes something through which differences between internal and external boundaries (the cell’s 
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internal environment and the environment external to the cell) are affected. In such an example the 
boundary is a membrane, which is sensitive. In other words the differential between varied 
conditions is represented by a boundary which emerges as a consequence of a difference. 
 
Figure 1 
Distinguishing a Difference 
Bateson argues that it is differences that get onto a map, in that something which is perceived, being 
the condition of something being different to something else, is what is distinguished on a map. We 
comprehend the world through difference - A concept difficult to explain without resorting to the 
word “difference”. It is a kind of self-referential notion of perception: an abstract matter which 
Bateson extends to the concept of information. “[W]hat we mean by information – the elementary 
unit of information – is ‘a difference that makes a difference’.”7 He extends the distinction of a 
difference such that information is seen as a difference which instigates a change, a change of state 
instigated by the recognition of there being a difference between one state and another (or the 
present state and some other). This is how time alters the concept of difference, such that a change 
in state is a difference between one moment and another. So information is something which incites 
change – a difference. It is a pattern of interplay (structure) between “things” (heterogeneity) that 
enables the difference to occur, inducing a difference such that the condition of difference is 
implicit. We will come to see how the distinction of a difference is significant to thinking about 
spatial formation, and how by thinking systemically about spatial configuration we can manipulate 
and steer the capacities of a system. First we look at how the simple distinction of a difference can 
be affected at different levels to determine a correlation between capacities at the local scale, and 
between local and global scales. 
Systems as Difference 
The difference is a boundary, a form having two sides, a notion Niklas Luhmann coupled with the 
concept of autopoiesis to explain his theory of “systems as difference”.8 He determined the systemic 
identification of a distinction to be the capacity to interpret a difference.
9
 No system can exist 
without an environment, and for there to be a system there has to be a difference between it and its 
environment, which the system distinguishes. It is an obscure concept because the formulation 
begins with a difference and ends with a difference – but the matter is only a paradox if we consider 
something coming into being through a difference in the first instance.
10
 The position taken in this 
paper is not the first instance (this implies the genesis of space) but the generation of spatial 
formations which stem from given conditions of environment. Besides, any design problem is 
already embedded in a heterogeneous context. In looking at the chemical basis of morphogenesis 
Turing emphasises something tends to develop from one pattern into another, rather from 
homogeneity into a pattern.
11
 There needs to be something which is different, however slight, which 
something else will react to, to generate change. We can see this by distinguishing one cell in a grid 
having a different state to others, which will respond by changing their state in relation to the 
condition of those cells surrounding them (Figure 2). In this way the simple division represented in 
Figure 1 can evolve into complex patterns, such as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2: Von Neumann and Moore local neighbourhoods with arrows indicating the direction of 
influence. 
 
Figure 3: Spiral pattern generated through cellular automata model of Belousov-Zhabotinsky 
reaction.
12
 
A boundary is a precondition and essential to the maintenance of a system, defining the difference 
between a system and its environment. A unity is formed through the correlation of the difference, 
through which space is constituted, such that the process defines “a space in which it can be realized 
as a concrete system, a space whose dimensions are the relations of production of the components 
that realize it”.13 This operative aspect of the condition of a boundary is summarised by Luhmann, 
who argued that a system is distinguished through form, which is determined by its structure and 
the difference between itself and the environment. “[The] point of departure for all systems 
theoretical analysis must be ‘the difference between system and environment’. Systems are oriented 
by their environment … They constitute and maintain themselves by creating and maintaining a 
difference from their environment, and they use their boundaries to regulate this difference.”14 
Heterogeneity is prerequisite, for through heterogeneity and the distinction of a difference further 
heterogeneity arises, and subsequently the elaboration of spatial configuration. A boundary is 
therefore a distinct component of a system or form, an entity distinguishing the coincidence 
between alternatives: things, states, properties, or qualities. 
The Spatial Saliency of Systems 
We thus determine how our definition of space, which is characterized by the properties of action 
and being, is effected and may be engaged with systemically. It is a process of interaction which is 
determined through perception and action, which emphasise the spatial salience of something: a 
component in a system, an organism interacting with its environment, or an entity in a computer 
model. In this way we are able to think about the condition of something and how it may interact 
with its environment at a variety of scales. At the lowest level we can consider how a water 
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molecule will behave in relation to variable levels of water between two reservoirs which are 
connected: the example which DeLanda uses to explain Mills’ “Composition of Causes”.15 At 
another scale we may consider how the different aspects of a thunderstorm interact: the differences 
between periodic air flows, temperature or pressure gradients. In his paper DeLanda points out that 
the way in which the components which constitute a system interact, and the way in which systems 
interact with other systems (such as the organs of the body), are “with each other through their own 
external surfaces or membranes, by excreting biochemical substances or sensing them through 
embedded receptors”.16 DeLanda echoes the significance of boundaries and the capacity of an 
autonomous entity to distinguish a difference. We refer here to the semiotic nature of an entity’s 
integration with its environment. A matter illustrated in von Uexküll’s model of the functional cycle 
(Figure 4), which extends from his notion of Umwelt.
17
 The manner through which this is effected is 
the capacity (receptors which sense) to distinguish a difference, which determine, through the 
existence of a boundary (surfaces and membranes), the distinction of a difference. 
 
Fig 4: Uexküll’s model of the functional cycle      
 
Fig 5: Perception-action is a loop describing agent behaviour. 
Uexküll’s functional cycle illustrates interaction as a loop which Pentti Määttänen has explicated as 
a simple condition of an entity’s distinction and effectuation of change. Määttänen explains that in 
action modification of other things is more prominent than their affect on the entity, compared to 
perception, where the affect on the entity is greater than on the object.
18
 A loop can therefore be 
visualised (see Figure 5) where ongoing action (output) is controlled with the help of received 
perceptual input. Perception is taken here not as cognitive but simply as the distinction of a 
difference: the capacity to distinguish a difference between different conditions. So, a boundary is 
conceived when a distinction is determined between variants, creating a form: a thing that has two 
sides. A system, being autonomous, distinguishes, in the sense of a cell reacting to its context. For 
example an amoebae reacting to levels of cyclic AMP,
19
 a snowflake crystallising, or the reaction-
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diffusion processes of substance concentrations through space and time (see Figure 3).  
Looking back to Figure 1, one side is determined as different from the other through focus on one 
of, or an aspect of one of, the conditions present. Luhmann argues that in drawing a distinction the 
two sides cannot be surveyed simultaneously, because distinction is an operation. The process is 
asymmetric in that one side of a boundary is surveyed before the other. A distinction is effected by a 
differentiation and the discrimination of the difference from one side. “Boundaries given in 
experience are in many cases ‘asymmetrical’ (so that we might in certain circumstances talk of 
‘oriented boundaries’).”20 In terms of a system, its coupling and communication with its 
environment, the notion of oriented boundaries is a significant description: whether it is from the 
perspective of an external observer distinguishing the difference between an area of blue or yellow 
or the monitoring of cyclic AMP by an amoeba – reacting to effects external to it, i.e. environmental 
constraints. It is a matter of interpretation determined by the state of the interpreting entity and its 
context - the interpreter being a system which is itself a difference. So from this perspective we 
consider the capacities of an entity locally, thereby enabling interaction through which the 
distinction of a difference enables boundaries and spatial formation.  
Looking at Artificial Systems: Naturally 
William Mitchell refers to architecture as “an art of distinctions”. Distinctions between solid and 
void, internal and external, and so on determine boundaries between categories around which 
differences are recognised. “When such distinctions are made an amorphous world is transformed 
into a world that has distinct parts organised in some particular way”.21 The condition of spatial 
relations being wholes and parts, parts of parts, and the boundaries between is the description of 
how one entity relates to another. Looking at human-made products as wholes, constituted by the 
arrangements of parts which fit together in some way, we can determine a pattern of organisation in 
which we perceive the whole’s gestalt. We do not refer here to the general understanding of gestalt 
theory that posits the form of something to be greater than the sum of its parts. As DeLanda 
highlights in his essay, the perception of a condition is not a matter of the “sum” of its parts.22 The 
general definition of gestalt, and its relation to the concept of emergence, is misplaced because, 
from a systems theory point of view, it places emphasis on a particular aspect of a system. It is a 
misconception which Kurt Lewin disputed, contending the sum is not greater than its parts but 
rather is different.
23
 Understanding the products of human design as systems of association between 
discrete components which are combined in some manner to form a whole, we comprehend the 
whole as an (artificial) system which has different properties to the sum of its parts but is not 
superior. 
Looking internally there is a distinction between components constituting something which is 
natural and animate and a human-made artefact. In the former the components are autonomous. 
This is what defines the system as animate, whilst the latter form of system is inanimate, even in the 
case of an animised product, such as a piece of machinery – because the parts have no autonomy. 
One can enhance artefacts by embellishing components with independence. Such is the case with 
interactive architecture, in which buildings, or more specifically aspects of them such as façades, 
are manufactured out of components which are in some way aware of their context. A typical 
example is the component which is fabricated to alter its state in relation to that of its neighbours, in 
the same way a cell is conceived in John Conway’s Game of Life (figure 2). But whilst such 
installations produce kinaesthetic artefacts they are not autonomous in the same way as a living 
animate entity. An artefact may be structurally open and organisationally closed, properties which 
Maturana and Varela define as critical for autopoiesis, but what is affected is state change. It is not 
truly animate in the sense of having the capacity to change through evolutionary processes – 
because the components of the system only have the power to self-organise between specific levels 
of composition. What this means is that the creative capacity of the system is constrained. Whilst 
the composition is adaptive, the (animate) form operates within particular limits. 
To escape these constraints we need to think of architectural artefacts as artificial systems. In so 
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doing we approach their ontology in a manner akin to natural complex dynamical systems. Given 
architectural artefacts are coupled to the behaviour of users, they are inherently determined by the 
complexity of users’ spatial tendencies – tendencies which are complex. Embracing complexity we 
perceive physical space as a complex dynamical system. In so doing we engage with the self-
organising tendencies and the adaptive behaviour emerging through the contextual interrelation of 
autonomous entities’ interactions. The conditions of architecture become a unified complex of 
interacting systems with which we can engage – like mavericks tuning the improbability drive.24 
Engaging with Emergence 
Paul Humphreys notes that “[a]pproaches to emergence are often divided into two broad categories, 
those of diachronic and synchronic emergence. The first approach primarily, but not exclusively, 
emphasizes the emergence of novel phenomena across time; the second emphasizes the co-
existence of novel ‘higher level’ objects or properties with objects or properties existing at some 
‘lower level’.”25 Synchronic emergence is the focused interplay between upward and downward 
causation,
26
 enabling “focused systemic behaviour through constraining the action of 
components”.27 Diachronic emergence is the production of new patterns and thresholds of 
behaviour over time. The system evolves – which is only possible through organic or computational 
processes. It may be thought of as truly creative. Through programming code and the capacity of 
the computer to emulate natural systems we can engage with diachronic emergence by considering 
the capacities of a system, and components within, engaging with their properties at the level of 
differences. Considering the implication of emergence to architecture our concern is the manner in 
which the differential properties of a system affect and are affected. Emergence is a property 
effected by the whole (or configuration, of constituent parts), such that none of the constituents 
possess the property individually, and that the property is characteristic of the system’s 
configuration.
28
 In this way we consider the means by which a system is effected in relation to the 
two categories of emergence outlined, and focus our attention on which is most pertinent to our 
design needs. Protevi argues discourse on emergence is typically subjugated to synchronic 
emergence, as a means to focus the self-organising tendencies of a system, but diachronic 
emergence is a means to tap the potential capacity of systems to generate novel spatial formations. 
Autopoietic Configuration 
Protevi points out that synchronic emergence is what Thompson and Varela refer to as “reciprocal 
causality”, that is, “the mutual constitution of local-to-global or ‘upward’ causality that produces 
focused systemic behaviour and the global-to-local, or downward, causality that constrains the local 
interactions of components”.29 A braiding together of local and global processes, of which 
autopoiesis is a prime example: a concept responding to the question “what is life?”, explaining 
how a system can self-organise and self-maintain through a structural coupling with its environment. 
A spatial condition determined by a closed unity, establishing a boundary through which the system 
is structurally coupled with but has autonomy from its environment. Autopoietic organisation is an 
appealing model constituting a closed domain of relations, but its transfer to social systems is a 
moot issue. The concept is explicitly related to biology. Whilst autopoiesis has been applied to 
human social systems we are satisfied with Maturana’s reasons for opposing the extension of the 
concept beyond biology.
30
 Although concerned with self-organisation as a means of generating and 
configuring spatial formation, the issue of self-creation (which is the focus of autopoiesis) is a 
matter beyond our concern. The concept cannot be applied as is, the main points of contention being 
that the concept is (a) essentially a cognitive model (decoupled from the world) and (b) a machine-
like abstraction. It is an abstract representation of biological systems, describing processes (such as 
cell metabolism) cybernetically. Whilst the machine metaphor is useful, it conjures a Cartesian 
notion of determinism and predictability.
31
 Without wanting to align oneself with the philosophy in 
which Maturana and Varela embed their theory of autopoiesis, the concept itself can be extremely 
useful.
32
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The appealing aspect of autopoiesis is that spatial organisation is an inherent property of a system: 
by constituting a closed domain of relations which are specified only with respect to its constitutive 
organisational and structural patterns. The system exists, or more specifically, functions and 
behaves as a result of its environment – and the capacity of the system’s parts to distinguish a 
difference. The process of interaction between the system and its environment, which shapes the 
system as well as the environment, is a structural coupling: congruence between system and 
environment. A plasticity of structure, through which change arising in one may prompt change in 
the other as well as a structural change in the system, which may affect a change in the system’s 
behaviour. By focusing on the aspect of a system being a unity structurally coupled with its 
environment, to which it is different, we may side-step the problematic transfer of autopoiesis 
beyond biology. Of particular significance to the issue of space and form is the operative condition 
of a boundary. “[A] necessary feature [of autopoietic systems] is the presence of a boundary which 
is produced by a dynamics such that the boundary creates the conditions required for this 
dynamics”,33 creating the closed condition which enables the system to maintain itself. Luhmann 
emphasised this aspect, stating “a ‘system’ can always be called a ‘form’ under the condition that 
the concept of form must always apply to the difference between system and environment”.34 By 
ignoring the issue of self-creation we are left with the characteristics of an autonomic system. 
Autonomic Organisation 
How a system comes into being is a principal concern of autopoiesis. An autonomic system is not 
so profound. The focus is on a system’s actions and the way it shapes a world into significance. 
Autonomic systems are defined by what they do, what purpose they serve. They are complex 
dynamical systems, classified so as to emphasise the aspect of autonomy. Typical examples of an 
autonomic system are the immune system, ant colonies and organisms. Autonomic systems have a 
function (and perform tasks) and are able to operate independently: the immune system detects and 
defends the body against foreign bodies and infection; an organism strives to survive, as does an ant 
colony. Common characteristics of autonomic systems are that they are independent, distributed, 
emergent, adaptive and self-organising. 
The components which constitute the system are central: the cells of the immune system; ants in an 
ant colony. Being autonomous, they define the autonomy of the system. If a system is considered to 
be autonomous then “the centre of attention is placed on emergent behaviours and internal self-
organising processes which define what counts as relevant interactions”.35 Computationally, Liu and 
Tsui specify that an autonomous entity consists of a detector(s), effector(s) and a repository of local 
behaviour rules.
36
 Detectors enable an entity to sense and measure external differences, which 
stimulate or influence the entity to do something. Effectors enable it to express action(s), which can 
be internal changes of state or external display of actions. Von Uexküll’s functional cycle is a model 
describing detector-effector interplay, explaining the congruence between an entity and its 
environment (Figure 4), which effects behaviour (Figure 5). 
The Physicality of Spatial Formation: An Innate Constraint 
The environment plays a significant role in two ways. Firstly it is where the components of the 
system reside and behave (the system is itself a domain as well as the environment which the 
system inhabits); and secondly the environment (in the case of systems such as ant colonies) can act 
as a medium for indirect communication between the entities constituting the system. This is the 
significance of distributed representation – for example, how systems such as ant colonies 
communicate through pheromones. Being different from its environment, an autonomously 
organised system is distinguishable. It has the capacity to respond to external perturbations and 
differences in its environment by performing actions. To think about an autonomic system is to 
think about a system on a variety of levels: 
 in relation to its context, and thereby about what the system does, how it behaves and what 
effects prompt it towards particular behaviours; 
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 as a unity which is different from the sum of its parts but which exists because of agency 
between its parts, which are independent entities (that may form separate component 
systems intrinsic to the system generally) that form a network of interactions; and 
 in relation to how its parts behave and respond to the environment and other systems with 
which it is connected or resides alongside. 
Bourgine and Varela outline the significance of autonomy, with regard to computation (in the field 
of artificial life), stipulating two hypotheses: every autonomous system is (1) operationally closed, 
and (2) behaves as an abductive machine with a hermeneutic acquired capacity close to unity along 
its trajectory of states. By employing the model of an autonomic system one can engage with the 
virtual capacities of a system, by taking into account “the structure of the possibility spaces 
involved with tendencies”.37 Two aspects, significant to architectural concerns, which transfer from 
the conception of an autonomic system, are: 
 that space is a constraint, and  
 that we can focus the capacities of such systems towards some condition – thereby evoking 
the potential capacity of novel spatial formation by stimulating the inherent spatiality of the 
system. 
Systems Thinking in Architecture 
The built environment, the setting for everyday life, renders buildings restrained to practicalities 
and functionality: restraints which define “instances”. Whilst architects draw on the biological 
processes of morphogenesis and evolution to generate interactive architectural assemblies, a 
building is a product. It is an assembly, and thereby can only adapt in some way within specific 
parameters. For example a facade may change under different conditions and constraints;
38
 a wall or 
internal structure may react to movement or environmental events;
39
 or a building may be conceived 
robotically.
40
 Experiments in self-configuring buildings (such as the robotic structures of d’Estree 
Sterk) suggest a future in which the autonomous built environment is a reality. The Generator 
project (by Cedric Price, John and Julia Frazer) proposed how the conditions of architecture could 
be set through user interaction, or the building might configure itself if it got bored.
41
 Whilst 
enchanting, the practicalities of furniture, equipment, toys, inhabitants and pets prevent such 
innovation – today at least. The matter is not so much a technological issue as a philosophical one. 
Architectural scenarios are inherently complex. By embracing this complexity we look to evoke the 
ontology of novel spatial formations, in a manner which unifies theory with practice. When the 
design process begins to focus on a solution we are dealing with an “instance” - what DeLanda calls 
an “actual”, a material form. Prior to this point what one is doing is exploring the “virtual”.42 Once 
the actual is ascertained, the way we can conceive a design in relation to the concept of emergence 
becomes constrained. At this point one is concerned with exploring the virtual field of an instance to 
influence the direction of an “actual”: concerned with how the properties of the system may be 
manipulated to direct the outcome of the self-organising process. This is exploring the synchronic 
capacities of the system: the domain of manipulating, coaxing and tweaking instances. 
Looking to natural systems to express the creative capacity of (diachronic) emergence we note the 
example given by Protevi regarding the distinction between weather and climate: the weather is 
variable, while the climate is stable. Our current climate is the condition determined by one attractor 
of a global system, which consists of various attractors in a particular relation. Perturbations could 
change the current condition towards another attractor, radically altering our climate, perhaps to 
another ice age or to something else – or to a new condition that may arise from a restructuring of 
the phase space, creating a new distribution of singularities at the global level. Climatic conditions 
may therefore be considered a repertoire – and our current climate is but one expression.43 
Emergence is a means to reapproach design. It allows one to engage with the virtual, redefining 
theory in a way that disintegrates boundaries between art and science, focusing our understanding 
of space and thereby of the generation of form. In so doing it is most productive and beneficial to 
engage with the concept, in the design process, at the diachronic level, in order to understand the 
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affordances of the system one is involved with. To do so we need to focus on the capacities of 
components and the systems which they constitute. We need to focus on interaction at different 
scales, and between wholes. By engaging with emergence at the diachronic level design has the 
potential to engage with the creativity of complex dynamical systems. 
Tapping Novelty 
We have illustrated how we can perceive the interplay between entities at different scales through 
the distinction of a difference, and how this may be effected through the concept of autopoiesis. By 
focusing on the autonomy of components we reapproach spatial formation in architecture, 
ontologically, through engaging with the organisational capacities of complex dynamical systems. 
In so doing we manipulate the agency of components in a system and focus the constraints so that 
we can steer the system’s properties towards some purpose. But with regard to the different 
categories of emergence, we tend to only engage with emergence at the synchronic level when 
working with self-organising systems. Only through diachronic emergence can we provoke the 
production of novel patterns or the new distribution of singularities that would restructure the 
tendencies of the system and enlarge its virtual capacities. As noted, synchronic emergence is useful 
to focus the capacities of a system to determine the actual, because the processes of the system are 
homeostatic. Balance is the chief operation of such systems – in the sense that they perform to 
maintain homeostasis. If perturbed beyond certain limits then they expire. If we are to explore the 
creative capacity of systemic interplay and the potential affordances between entities, it is therefore 
necessary to enable the system to cope with encroaching perturbations which challenge its structure. 
In other words we want to agitate and inflict disruption on a system in order that it may shake up 
and reorganise. 
Hacking the System 
Keith Ansell Pearson examines the “machinic” 44 character of systems in an attempt to grasp the 
virtuality of the actual entities entering into differential relations.
45
 Pearson argues that it is possible 
to dislocate a system from its homeostatic circularity and expose its organisation to allow 
examination of its virtual tendencies, and the capacities of its virtual domain. The machinic 
character of entities, in other words their capacities to form relations with other entities, and their 
capacities to affect and be affected, enable transversal communication and the formation of 
assemblages. “Machinic assemblages”46 mesh together social, technological and biological entities 
present, both in the design process and the inhabitation of the architectural artefact. The practice of 
hacking therefore is becoming relevant in the attempt to dismantle the autonomic system where its 
organisation is a constraint to exploring the creative capacity.
47
 One of the main practices of a 
hacker is “to produce or apply the abstract to information and express the possibility of new worlds, 
beyond necessity”.48 To hack is not a purposeful action steering a particular event in a certain 
direction; rather, it is the opening of new domains where new capacities of the system might find a 
way to be expressed. We see the architect as a hacker. The task is to problematise the normal 
functioning of the computational model. Every hack produces a common plane for different things 
to enter into relation and therefore to differentiate the normal functioning of their shared goal. The 
action of hacking is to push the system beyond a certain threshold where positive feedback triggers 
diachronic emergence. It is for this reason that we see hacking as a means to operate on the virtual 
to transform the actual. 
The virtual is the true domain of the hacker. It is from the virtual that the hacker 
produces ever-new expressions of the actual. To the hacker, what is represented as 
being real is always partial, limited, perhaps even false. To the hacker there is 
always a surplus of possibility expressed in what is actual, the surplus of the 
virtual. This is the inexhaustible domain of what is real without being actual, what 
is not but which may be. To hack is to release the virtual into the actual, to express 
the difference of the real.
49
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By conceiving architecture as a complex of dynamical systems the architect is able (through 
computation) to tap “the surplus of virtuality”. In other words the architect-hacker thinks at the level 
of system components, recognising processes in formation. Thereby, being able to affect the stage 
of dynamism and be affected by it, the architect taps on the emergence of potential capacities that 
trigger the production of novel spatial arrangements. Hacking the system in our understanding is the 
imaginative use of computational systems to map the virtual capacities of a system. Architects are 
able to experiment with collective behaviour by drawing on natural systems such as swarms and 
neural networks. Through computation we can engage with low-level interactions of a system to 
map emergent capacities in the production of spatial configurations and forms. Through emulating 
and tailoring natural systems we can map “the structure of the real virtuality associated with the 
capacities”50 and utilise them in architectural practice. Spatial formation is reapproached through 
interplay between different conditions and interrelated entities, effecting boundaries which emerge 
through the capacities of the system. It is, therefore, not purpose or transcendent ideas that govern 
the production of space and form but the quasi-causality
51
 of the distribution of singularities in a 
systems phase space which the architect-hacker brings together, by linking the differential relations 
of interacting computational entities.    
Conclusion 
In nature there are two forms of materiality: (1) living and animate beings, for which form takes 
shape through interaction between autonomous entities and their context; and (2) inanimate objects, 
whose form is directed by forces acting upon them. The shape and structure of living and animate 
beings arise through interplay between systems which are determined by the actions of discrete 
physical entities. The autonomy of these entities is effected through agency, creating patterns 
through which regularities emerge. In other words living and animate beings are systems whose 
form is effected through the autonomy of entities constituting the system, and their properties. 
Inanimate objects have no autonomy; their form is determined through forces acting upon them. 
The properties constituting a physical entity, such as a rock, are still. Other than having properties 
of malleability they play no part in their actual forming and shaping. They are physical entities 
which are dormant: akin to dumb actors in a play, which is being acted out around their physical 
being. Human-made forms are products, in that they are assembled from parts in some manner to 
configure a whole. They are most akin to inanimate objects found in nature, but by approaching 
their design through distributed representation we are able to perceive the capacities and engage 
with their properties in a manner which lies between the two forms of materiality in nature. 
Philosophical debate on the concept of emergence concerns science and art as a whole, with 
particular reflections from the fields of biology, social science and cognitive science having 
particular effect on the manner in which the notion of emergence is applied in architecture: 
extending the theory to practice. In this essay we have considered physical emergence and how our 
understanding of the concept affects the manner in which we conceive spatial formation. The 
generative capacity of code emulates the autonomy of the living, through artful mechanisation 
emulating natural materiality. 
We have drawn a course through varied concepts, pertinent to architecture, to show how in relation 
to the concept of emergence we might reapproach the generation of space and form. We have shown 
how architectural problems of spatial configuration can be understood systemically by focusing on 
the capacity of an entity to distinguish a difference. Through autonomy spatial formations emerge 
through local-to-global interactions, which an architect can engage with. Traditional approaches to 
configuring space quantify problems, flattening them to define a problem as manageable. We do not 
know what richness is lost. We argue that this complexity should be embraced and used as an 
engine to drive the design process. Embraced at the initial stage of design we can scrutinise the 
affordances of a system, exploring its virtual capacities to cause imbalance - potentially creating (or 
rather discovering) new conditions and system formation. In so doing we engage with the concept 
of emergence diachronically. After which the practicalities of steering a solution towards a 
12 
particular resolution renders engagement with the concept of emergence synchronic. This is based 
on the premise that a problem is a system when perceived ecologically. Hacking is a way to 
experiment with the virtual capacities of a system. The architect-hacker explores the spatio-
temporal dynamisms of a system in a manner which enables the production of new singularities. 
This in turn enables the mapping of a systems repertoire, in a way which applies Bateson’s dictum 
that “differences are the things that get onto a map”.52 We can therefore affect the system’s 
repertoire, exploring how one set of variables might influence the system in one direction or another. 
This is one way in which we as architects can really engage with emergence and evoke the potential 
creativity of complex dynamical systems. 
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